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Antitrust and Competition Law Update: Tetra
Laval–A landmark judgement on EC Merger
Control
Ulrich Quack, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, James Burling, John Ratliff, Suyong
Kim, Douglas Melamed, and William Kolasky
Abstract
On 15 February 2005, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) dismissed the Eu-
ropean Commission’s appeal in the Tetra Laval/Sidel merger case.2 The ECJ’s
judgment establishes two signi?cant principles that apply beyond the facts of this
particular case:The judgment con?rms that the Court of First Instance (CFI) for
all practical purposes will continue to be the ultimate arbiter of disputes about
the Commission’s use of evidence and economic assessment in merger control
proceedings. The ECJ has signaled that it will generally not entertain appeals as-
serting that the CFI engaged in excessive scrutiny of the Commission’s assessment
and therefore overstepped the permissible boundaries of judicial review. Had the
ECJ upheld the arguments raised by the Commission, this may well have had a
chilling effect on the CFI’s willingness to subject the Commission’s merger deci-
sions to strict scrutiny. This in turn would have severely limited the effectiveness
of judicial review, in particular in the age of the Commission’s “more economics-
based approach” and the increasing importance of complex factual and economic
evidence in merger cases. • While the judgment does not preclude prohibition
of conglomerate mergers under the Merger Regulation, it imposes stringent legal
and practical constraints on the Commission’s ability to challenge such mergers
on the basis of “leveraging”- type theories of competitive harm: Finding that “the
chains of cause and effect [underlying leveraging theories] are dimly discernible,
uncertain, and dif?cult to establish”, the ECJ required a particularly high quality of
evidence to support a conclusion that the leveraging developments will occur fol-
lowing the merger. By requiring that the Commission examine on a case-by-case
basis whether behavioral commitments (such as not to bundle different products)
might be effective, the ECJ’s judgment makes it less likely that the Commission
will pursue leveraging theories in merger review. The judgment effectively com-
pels the Commission to reassess its method of evaluating commitments, which
currently calls for the rejection of even the most carefully crafted long-term be-
havioral commitments that adequately address conglomerate concerns.
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On 15 February 2005, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) dismissed the 
European Commission’s appeal in 
the Tetra Laval/Sidel merger case.2 
The ECJ’s judgment establishes two 
signiﬁcant principles that apply beyond 
the facts of this particular case: 
• The judgment conﬁrms that the Court 
of First Instance (CFI) for all practical 
purposes will continue to be the 
ultimate arbiter of disputes about the 
Commission’s use of evidence and 
economic assessment in merger control 
proceedings. The ECJ has signaled that 
it will generally not entertain appeals 
asserting that the CFI engaged in 
excessive scrutiny of the Commission’s 
assessment and therefore overstepped 
the permissible boundaries of judicial 
review. Had the ECJ upheld the 
arguments raised by the Commission, 
this may well have had a chilling effect 
on the CFI’s willingness to subject the 
Commission’s merger decisions to 
strict scrutiny. This in turn would have 
severely limited the effectiveness of 
judicial review, in particular in the age 
of the Commission’s “more economics-
based approach” and the increasing 
importance of complex factual and 
economic evidence in merger cases. 
• While the judgment does not preclude 
prohibition of conglomerate mergers 
under the Merger Regulation, it imposes 
stringent legal and practical constraints 
on the Commission’s ability to challenge 
such mergers on the basis of “leveraging”-
type theories of competitive harm: 
o Finding that “the chains of cause and 
effect [underlying leveraging theories] 
are dimly discernible, uncertain, 
and difﬁcult to establish”, the ECJ 
required a particularly high quality 
of evidence to support a conclusion 
that the leveraging developments 
will occur following the merger. 
o By requiring that the Commission 
examine on a case-by-case basis 
whether behavioral commitments (such 
as not to bundle different products) 
might be effective, the ECJ’s judgment 
makes it less likely that the Commission 
will pursue leveraging theories 
in merger review. The judgment 
effectively compels the Commission 
to reassess its method of evaluating 
commitments, which currently calls 
Tetra Laval–A Landmark Judgment 
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1.    Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP represented Tetra Laval in the initial administrative 
proceedings before the Commission, and was co-counsel in the litigation before the CFI and the ECJ.
2.    Case C-12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, judgment of 15 February 2005, not yet 
reported. In a second judgment (Case C-13/03 P) the ECJ declared as devoid of purpose 
the Commission’s related action requesting the annulment of the CFI’s judgment that 
rendered void the Commission’s divestiture decision in the Tetra Laval/Sidel case.
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for the rejection of even the most 
carefully crafted long-term behavioral 
commitments that adequately 
address conglomerate concerns. 
The Tetra Laval/Sidel Saga
The ECJ’s judgment ends a long-running 
saga. Tetra Laval, through its Tetra Pak 
business, is the leading manufacturer of 
aseptic and non-aseptic carton packaging 
systems. Sidel is a leader in PET packaging 
equipment, in particular stretch-blow 
molding (SBM) machines for making 
empty PET bottles. In October 2001, 
the Commission prohibited Tetra Laval’s 
proposed acquisition of Sidel based on 
conglomerate concerns. It argued that 
the transaction would allow Tetra Laval 
to leverage its market power into a 
neighboring market, and eliminate potential 
competition across packaging systems. 
Tetra Laval appealed the prohibition 
decision to the CFI, which in its judgment of 
25 October 2002 comprehensively rejected 
the Commission’s substantive assessment. 
In the light of the CFI’s annulment of the 
original Commission decision, Tetra Laval 
re-notiﬁed the transaction for a second 
review by the Commission. On 13 January 
2003, the Commission approved the 
transaction without opening a detailed 
second-phase investigation. While the 
Commission’s clearance decision allowed 
Tetra Laval to close the transaction, 
the Commission appealed the CFI’s 
judgment to the ECJ on 8 January 2003.
The Commission’s appeal raised 
fundamental questions about the 
standard of judicial review and the 
Commission’s burden of proof in merger 
cases generally, and with respect to 
conglomerate mergers in particular. The 
Commission’s appeal also questioned 
the obligations imposed by the CFI to 
take into account the possible illegality of 
leveraging predicted by the Commission, 
as well as behavorial commitments not 
to engage in leveraging-type behavior.3 
Standard of Judicial Review
At the core of the Commission’s appeal 
was its claim that the CFI’s judgment 
imposed too heavy a burden of proof 
on the Commission when reviewing 
mergers and thereby departed from a 
standard of judicial review previously 
deﬁned by the Community Courts. The 
Commission argued that in its judgment, 
rather than requiring a body of “cogent 
and consistent” evidence, the CFI had 
obligated the Commission to produce 
“convincing evidence” when challenging 
a merger. According to the Commission, 
this “new” standard unduly limited the 
discretion it needed to have in cases 
involving complex factual and economic 
matters. The Commission argued that 
the CFI had effectively transformed 
its role into that of a body with full 
competence to rule on matters in all their 
complexity and thus entitled to substitute 
its views for those of the Commission.
The ECJ disagreed with the Commission’s 
views. In the ECJ’s words, “not only 
must the Community Courts, inter alia, 
establish whether the evidence relied 
on is factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent, but also whether that evidence 
contains all the information which must 
be taken into account in order to assess a 
complex situation and whether it is capable 
of substantiating the conclusions drawn 
from it” (para. 39, emphasis added). On 
that basis, the CFI’s requirement that 
proof of the anti-competitive effects of a 
merger calls for “a precise examination, 
supported by convincing evidence, of the 
circumstances which allegedly produce 
those effects” is not a new standard 
imposed upon the Commission, but simply 
a reﬂection of the essential function of 
evidence, which is to establish convincingly 
the merits of a merger decision. 
The ECJ did not adopt the view suggested 
by Advocate General Tizzano, that the 
division of power between the Commission 
2
3.    The Commission also appealed on three other grounds that are more speciﬁc to the facts 
at issue in the case. The ECJ rejected all of these as either inadmissible or unfounded. 
“...not only must the 
Community Courts, inter 
alia, establish whether 
the evidence relied on is 
factually accurate, reliable 
and consistent, but also 
whether that evidence 
contains all the 
information which must 
be taken into account 
in order to assess a 
complex situation and 
whether it is capable 
of substantiating 
the conclusions 
drawn from it.”
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and the Community judicature did not 
allow the CFI “to enter into the merits 
of the Commission’s complex economic 
assessment or to substitute its own point 
of view for that of the institution”.4 The 
ECJ in particular did not share Tizzano’s 
criticism that the CFI had substituted its 
own judgment for that of the Commission 
with regard to an important part of the 
analysis, i.e., the predicted growth of 
PET packaging for a number of “sensitive” 
beverages. Unlike the Advocate General, 
the ECJ dismissed the Commission’s 
arguments in this respect in two short 
paragraphs. The ECJ pointed out that 
these arguments relate to ﬁndings of fact 
that the CFI was able to base on various 
items in the contested decision itself. 
The ECJ thus conﬁrmed the fundamental 
role of the CFI in the review of merger 
cases. While the CFI will continue to 
exercise judicial self-restraint with respect 
to technical questions, the need to respect 
the Commission’s “margin of discretion” 
will not prevent the CFI from looking 
closely at the Commission’s analysis. This 
is particularly important in view of the 
increasingly sophisticated economic 
analysis and evidence that is offered up in 
contested merger cases. For the merging 
parties, the length of proceedings before 
the CFI already limits the effectiveness 
of judicial review as a practical matter. 
Shielding the Commission’s decisions 
from judicial scrutiny simply because of 
the apparent complexity of the economic 
assessment would have made litigation 
in merger cases even less of an option. 
Burden of Proof and 
Presumptions 
The ECJ also addressed the Commission’s 
burden of proof in merger cases generally 
and conglomerate merger cases speciﬁcally. 
The ECJ referred to the difﬁculties inherent 
in merger review and noted that “a 
prospective analysis of the kind necessary 
in merger control must be carried out with 
great care since it does not entail the 
examination of past events [...], but rather a 
prediction of events which are more or less 
likely to occur in [the] future if a decision 
prohibiting the planned concentration or 
laying down the conditions for it is not 
adopted” (para. 42, emphasis added). 
For conglomerate mergers, the ECJ made 
more explicit the evidentiary obligation 
it expects the Commission to discharge: 
“The analysis of a “conglomerate-type” 
concentration is a prospective analysis 
in which, ﬁrst, the consideration of a 
lengthy period of time in the future and, 
secondly, the leveraging necessary to 
give rise to a signiﬁcant impediment to 
effective competition means that the 
chains of cause and effect are dimly 
discernible, uncertain and difﬁcult to 
establish. That being so, the quality of the 
evidence produced by the Commission 
[...] is particularly important.” (para. 
44). The ECJ highlighted the difﬁculties 
inherent in proving a leveraging theory5  
and endorsed the “hard look” at the 
evidentiary record performed by the CFI. 
Interestingly, the ECJ did not explicitly 
address the Commission’s argument that 
this burden of proof effectively creates 
a presumption in favor of the legality 
of mergers (or at least conglomerate 
mergers), whereas the Merger Regulation 
imposes “symmetrical” obligations upon 
the Commission–meaning that it has 
to meet the same standard of proof 
regardless of whether it is clearing or 
prohibiting a transaction.6 The Advocate 
General had explicitly rejected the 
3
4.   Opinion of AG Tizzano of 25 May 2004, not yet reported, para. 89.
5.   See Völcker, Leveraging as a theory of competitive harm after Tetra Laval,
40 C.M.L.Rev. 581-614 (2003). 
6.   According to Article 2(2) ECMR (in its amended version), “a concentration which would 
not signiﬁcantly impede effective competition in the common market [...] shall be declared 
compatible with the common market”. On the other hand, according to Article 2(3) ECMR (in 
its amended version), “a concentration which would signiﬁcantly impede effective competition 
in the common market [...] shall be declared incompatible with the common market”.
While the CFI will 
continue to exercise 
judicial self-restraint 
with respect to technical 
questions, the need to 
respect the Commission's 
“margin of discretion” 
will not prevent the CFI 
from looking closely 
at the Commission's 
analysis. This is 
particularly important in 
view of the increasingly 
sophisticated economic 
analysis and evidence 
that is offered up in 
contested merger cases.
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Commission’s “symmetry” argument, 
holding that in the “grey area” of cases in 
which it is particularly difﬁcult to foresee 
the effects of the notiﬁed transaction, the 
Commission is under an obligation to clear 
the transaction. The Advocate General 
based this conclusion on the fact that 
the Merger Regulation provides that any 
transaction is deemed to be cleared if the 
Commission fails to make a decision within 
the time limits prescribed in the Merger 
Regulation, and that Article 82 allows for 
ex-post control of the combined entity.7  
The ECJ did not embrace the theory, 
but it also chose to leave the Advocate 
General’s opinion as persuasive authority 
for future “grey zone” evidentiary cases.  
Illegality of Alleged 
Leveraging Conduct
According to the CFI’s judgment, the 
Commission was required to consider 
whether a company’s incentive to 
engage in leveraging practices may be 
“reduced, or even eliminated, owing to 
the illegality of the conduct in question, 
the likelihood of its detection, action 
taken by the competent authorities, 
both at Community and national level, 
and the ﬁnancial penalties which could 
ensue” (CFI judgment, para. 159). 
The ECJ agreed with the CFI insofar 
as it required the Commission to 
examine the likelihood of leveraging 
comprehensively, taking into account both 
the relevant incentives and disincentives 
for such conduct. The ECJ also viewed the 
“possibility that the conduct is unlawful” as 
a relevant disincentive (para. 74). However, 
it then held that “it would run counter 
to the [Merger] Regulation’s purpose of 
prevention” to require the Commission 
to engage in the kind of “exhaustive and 
detailed examination of the rules of various 
legal orders [...] and of the enforcement 
policy practiced in them.” The ECJ viewed 
such an assessment as “too speculative” 
and to require it “would not allow the 
Commission to base its assessment on 
all of the relevant facts with a view to 
establishing whether they support an 
economic scenario in which a development 
such as leveraging will occur” (para. 77). 
The implications of the ECJ’s 
pronouncements are not entirely clear, in 
particular because the ECJ did not spell 
out the legal or practical objections to 
the CFI’s test. The judgment does not 
appear to be saying that the unlawfulness 
of the stipulated leveraging conduct is 
irrelevant. Indeed, the judgment could 
be read as suggesting that where there 
is a high probability that the stipulated 
conduct constitutes an infringement of 
Article 82 or that the illegal conduct is 
essential for leveraging to occur, the 
Commission should take this into 
account.8 While there is uncertainty as 
to how an “illegality defense” will be 
incorporated in the analysis, the ECJ’s 
acceptance of behavioral commitments 
(discussed below) may make this a moot 
question for all practical purposes, because 
merging parties may incorporate the 
legal standards into their commitments.  
Behavioral Remedies 
During the administrative proceedings, 
Tetra Laval had offered a set of 
commitments, some of which were 
behavioral in nature. In particular, Tetra 
Laval had conﬁrmed its pre-existing pricing 
commitments from the Tetra Pak II Article 
82 case and committed not to bundle 
Tetra Pak’s carton packaging products 
and Sidel’s SBM machines. According 
to the Commission–which had quickly 
dismissed Tetra Laval’s commitments 
in the administrative proceedings–such 
commitments amounted to little 
more than a promise to refrain from 
engaging in illegal conduct and were 
4
7.    Opinion of AG Tizzano, paras. 75-81.
8.    “Moreover, if it is to be relevant, such an assessment calls for a high probability 
of the occurrence of the acts envisaged as capable of giving rise to objections on 
the ground that they are part of anti-competitive conduct” (para. 76).  
While there is uncertainty 
as to how an “illegality 
defense” will be 
incorporated in the 
analysis, the ECJ's 
acceptance of behavioral 
commitments may make 
this a moot question for 
all practical purposes, 
because merging parties 
may incorporate the 
legal standards into 
their commitments.
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therefore insufﬁcient under the principles 
established in the Gencor case.9 
The ECJ distinguished the facts at stake in 
the Tetra Laval case from those that had 
led to the CFI’s dismissal of behavioral-
type commitments in Gencor. Contrary 
to Gencor, in Tetra Laval the creation of 
dominance in the SBM market would only 
take place as a result of leveraging Tetra 
Laval’s power on the neighboring carton 
market, in particular through abusive 
conduct. In the ECJ’s view, in this type 
of scenario where structural changes will 
only be brought about after some conduct 
has taken place, commitments relating to 
the merged entity’s future conduct may 
prove an adequate remedy for preventing 
such conduct from occurring in the ﬁrst 
place. On that basis, the ECJ upheld the 
CFI’s ﬁnding that the Commission’s straight 
rejection, “as a matter of principle”, of 
behavioral remedies could not be sustained.
The ECJ’s judgment thus conﬁrmed that 
well-crafted behavioral remedies may 
validly serve to alleviate the Commission’s 
concerns in conglomerate cases. In fact, 
in a scenario such as that presented 
in the Tetra Laval case, a behavioral 
commitment may be the only effective 
remedy that is available, because the 
structural effects of an operation will only 
be perceived in the future, after (possibly 
anti-competitive) conduct has taken place.     
Conclusion
The ECJ’s Tetra Laval judgment is the 
most signiﬁcant clariﬁcation of EC merger 
review since Gencor. In conjunction with 
the CFI’s judgment, the ECJ’s judgment 
provides a tighter (and more coherent) 
framework for the analysis of all mergers, 
but particularly conglomerate mergers. 
The requirement that the Commission 
consider the possibility that the behavioral 
remedies offered by the merging 
parties may be sufﬁcient to alleviate the 
Commission’s anti-competitive concerns 
is a welcome development. This and 
other holdings in Tetra Laval may be 
an important pre-cursor for the CFI’s 
review of the pending GE/Honeywell case, 
where similar issues have been raised. 
The ECJ’s judgment also has broader 
implications, including as to the allocation 
of functions between the Commission as 
an administrative body and the Community 
Courts as a review body. The ECJ’s 
judgment is an important reminder that 
the Community Courts will be ready to 
vigorously scrutinize the Commission’s 
assessment of mergers in light of the 
evidence that has been adduced.     
5
9.   Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, judgment of 25 March 1999, 1999 ECR II-753. WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
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